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Attacks by the mujahidaat are arguably more deadly than those conducted by male 
fighters and could motivate other Muslim women to adopt suicide as the tactic of choice.  
The use of Muslim women to conduct martyrdom, or suicide, operations by male-
dominated terrorist groups could have implications on the jihadi mindset, challenging 
more conservative groups such as Al Qaeda, to reconsider the utility of the Muslim 
woman on the front lines of jihad.  These terrorist groups will likely exploit women to 
conduct operations on their behalf to advance their goals and achieve tactical gain.  
Muslim women are increasingly joining the global jihad, partly motivated by 
religious conviction to change the plight of Muslims under occupation, but others are 
actively recruited by Al Qaeda and local terrorist groups strained by increased arrests and 
deaths of male operatives to fight in the name of Islam. Convinced of the operational 
advantages of using a female fighter, and the media attention she garners—including 
some sympathy from the Muslim world—men began to rely on women to carry out 
attacks.   
While women enlisted and played a pivotal role in operations, including the 
veteran Palestinian female Leila Khalid for a myriad of successful hijackings in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, counterterrorism experts and analysts rarely focused on female 
terrorists.  According to Dr. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist, the notion of a 
woman perpetrating acts of violence “runs counter to Western stereotypes and 
misconceptions of male terrorists; we assume that women are second-class citizens and 
rely on the men to run the organization,” rather than challenging our prejudices of women 
in these terror networks.2  
 
Who Are the Mujahidaat? 
The mujahidaat are identified as Muslim female fighters, but in this study, they 
refer to female suicide bombers. The historical application of the term originated with the 
early Muslim women on the battlefield, fighting alongside Muslim men, who provided 
necessary logistics support, such as treating the wounded, donating their prized 
possessions for the war effort, and/or encouraging their husbands, sons and brothers to 
participate in jihad.3   
Today, the role of the mujahidaat has evolved, to include the increasingly accepted 
tactic of suicide as the preferred and popular weapon of choice. Within this amended 
definition, the rules of engagement have been broadened, although nowhere in the 
historical religious literature is suicide, the killing of non-combatants, and hostility 
against the aggressor, sanctioned.  Noted by an Islamic scholar, “Muslims are reminded 
in many ayat (verses in the Qur’an) that they should never commit aggression even 
                                                 
1 International Policy Analyst RAND Corporation farhana@rand.org 
2 Interview with Dr. Marc Sageman, October 2005. 
3 Busool, Assad Nimber, Muslim Women Warriors, Chicago: Al Huda Islamic Educational Foundation, 
1995, pp. 34-35 and 64. 
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 towards their sworn enemies.  Their response must not be disproportionate or go beyond 
the limits of the permission for armed jihad.”4
 
Jihad in the Qur’an 
Laden with inaccurate perceptions, jihad is today synonymous with “terrorism”, 
“extremism”, and “radicalism.” Before the early Muslims were granted permission to 
fight the pagan Quraysh—the Arab tribe whose belief in polytheism and injustice to the 
Muslims forced them to retreat to the city of Madina—jihad was, and is, an act of 
worship.  A more popular definition is derived from the Arabic root word jahada, which 
means to struggle.  For Muslims, regardless of their level of religiosity, jihad is a living, 
breathing construct. 
The more popularly cited verse, And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, 
but transgress not the limits. Truly Allah likes not the transgressors,5 permitted jihad 
within certain perimeters for self-defense. In these verses, the aim of fighting was 
threefold: “to stop aggression, to protect the Mission of Islam and to defend religious 
freedom.”6 But these early verses were to be disregarded and new definitions of 
permissible jihad were created after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924,7 attributed in 
part to the absence of a Caliph who could authorize the proclamation of jihad for Sunni 
Muslims.8
 The oversimplification of this term and the abrogation of the “lesser jihad”—or 
militant resistance—for the “Greater Jihad”, which is the spiritual internal reflection of 
Self, has historical depth in Islam and is supported by tradition and religious text. 
While there are many forms of jihad, all of which are defined by a set of rules, 
jihad is best described as self-defense. Defense against temptation, defense against Satan, 
defense against the unjust, and most commonly known in the West, jihad is defense 
against religious persecution. Senior Advisor of the Muslim Public Affairs Council 
(MPAC) in Washington, DC, Dr. Maher Hathout says, “Historically, fighting back 
against aggressors was prohibited during the thirteen years of the Meccan period…[but] 
after the migration to Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state, Muslims were 
concerned with how to defend themselves against aggression from their enemies.”9 After 
years of persecution and living in exile, the permission to fight came in response to a 
specific set of circumstances, and was “motivated by the fact that the Muslims suffered 
injustice and were forced to emigrate…without justification.”  Among the first Qur’ani 
verses for fighting is Verse 22: Leave is given to those who fought because they were 
wronged—surely God is able to help them—who were expelled from their habitations 
without right. 
Today, terrorists maintain that violence is the most effective means of 
communication. In his martyr video, alleged ringleader of the July 2005 attacks in 
London, Muhammad Saddique Khan says, “Our words are dead; they have no impact on 
                                                 
4 Dr. Louay Fatoohi, Jihad in the Qur’an: The Truth From The Source, Malaysia: A.S. Noordeen. 2002.  
p. 39-40. 
5 Qu’ran, 2:190. 
6 Shaltut, Mahmud, “The Koran and Fighting,” in Bernard and Lwry, pp. 74-79. 
 
8 David Cook, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press: 
2005. p. 93. 
9 Mathout, Maher, Jihad vs. Terrorism, Los Angeles: Multimedia Vera International, 2002, p. 49. 
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 you. We talk to you in a language you understand. We give them life with our blood.”10  
Male terrorists contend that armed resistance is a language understood by the West. Bin 
Ladin’s personal bodyguard, known by the name Abu Jandal, said in an interview, “They 
[the armed groups] became convinced that the only effective way to stop the United 
States’ interference is the Qa’ida way, i.e. by direct attacks and armed confrontations.”11 
These attacks, in the name of “holy war”, are not representative of jihad but terrorism.  
Dr. Hathout argues that jihad is not reflected in the United States Government definition 
of terrorism, described in the Code of Federal Regulations as: “...the unlawful use of 
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives.”12  
Therefore, Al Qaeda and like-minded groups unjustifiably argue that the use of 
violence is legitimized jihad. But the rules for jihad are clear, and the salient points 
include: 1) jihad is legitimized when it is “recognized and established [by the] Muslim 
authority, as a policy of the collectivity of the Muslims, to deter aggression;”13 2) jihad is 
to be declared publicly in order to be accepted, vice the coup de main that Al Qaeda and 
other radical groups have been known for. Hence, their clandestine lifestyle and 
operational behavior makes them identifiable with terrorism; 3) jihad is limited to 
combatants; and 4) finally, the ultimate goal of jihad is to cease hostilities and live in 
peace, rather than a continuum of conflict that has defined the war on terrorism with Al 
Qaeda.  
 How jihad became confused with terrorism is the fault of contemporary jihadist 
literature that reinterpreted jihad to suit their modern-day needs and struggles. Some 
Muslim ulama (scholars) have justified the use of violence against civilian and military 
targets by issuing fatwas (pronouncements) to grant terrorists permission to fight outside 
the original perimeters of Islamic jurisprudence. These scholars argue that warfare today 
is asymetrical, necessitating new rules of warfare, with new strategies and approaches to 
defeating the perceived enemies of Islam. Hence, suicide operations are allowed, for both 
Muslim men and women. 
Drawing upon contemporary Muslim jurists, verses in the Qur’an were corrupted 
by terrorists to justify violent acts. Twisting the verses’ intended meaning and taking out 
of context the established Islamic rules of warfare, terrorists have transgressed the limits 
of warfare, poisoned by their misunderstanding of jihad, and conflated by mixing local 
and global grievances of the Muslim world. Religious extremists have conveniently 
forgotten that Islam is a religion of balance, as stated in the Qur’an, We have made you a 
middle people…and He [God] has set the Balance. Do not transgress the Balance.”14
 
Why Now? 
Since at least 2000, there has been a gradual progression of suicide attacks 
conducted by Muslim women in new theaters of operation, including Uzbekistan, Egypt, 
                                                 
10 Aired by the Doha-based Arabs news service, Al Jazirah. July 2005. 
11 Afghanistan: Usama Bin Ladin’s Former Bodyguard on Al-Qa’ida Organization,” London Al Quds Al 
Arabi, 29 March 2005, p. 17.  GMP20050330000064  
12 Definition of terrorism by terrorismfiles.org, http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopaedia/terrorism.html  
13 Hathout, pp. 65-66. 
14 Qur’an, 2:143. 
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 and more recently, Iraq.15 The attack in Talafar, northern Iraq, by a female suicide 
bomber came as a surprise, but was predictable. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the  
latest coup de main at an army recruitment center on 28 September 2005 by a “blessed 
sister”. The Iraqi woman hid her weapon beneath her dress as she stood among job 
applicants before detonating; a similar tactic was used by women in the Irish Republican 
Army, who carried bombs beneath their clothing feigning pregnancy or wheeling 
weapons in baby carriages. The attack in late September was not the first by an Iraqi 
woman; in April 2003, two women, one pretending to be pregnant, blew up their car at a 
coalition checkpoint, killing three soldiers.16  Although attacks by women in Iraq are still 
relatively a new trend, an intelligence analyst argues that women will likely play a wider 
role in operations where “jihad is more akin to an insurgency and mobilizes an entire 
population against a clear aggressor.”17 That leaves Iraq vulnerable to attacks by female 
suicide bombers in the near future. 
The attacks in Egypt earlier this year by two women remain an anomaly. For years, 
Egyptian men, not women, cradled the growth of the jihadi movement, which led to the 
formation of different groups, varying in their membership and orientation.  However, the 
30 April 2005 shooting on a tourist bus in Cairo by two veiled Egyptian women is 
evidence that women in the Arab Muslim world can play an increasing role in operations. 
The women, both in their 20s, were related to the male perpetrator, Ehab Yousri Yassin. 
Negat Yassin was the bomber’s sister and Iman Ibrahim Khamis, his fiancée; they 
reportedly shot at the bus in revenge for Yassin’s death by Egyptian authorities, and shot 
themselves,18 probably to avoid capture. It remains unclear if the two women intended to 
commit suicide or chose the tactic to evade an arrest by Egyptian police.   
 While little is known about the two Egyptian women and their intentions for 
suicide, the story of a young Uzbek girl illustrates her determination to participate in a 
suicide attack in March 2003.   Nineteen-year old Dilnoza Holmuradova detonated 
explosives at Tashkent’s Chorsu Market, killing at least forty-seven people, including ten 
policemen.19 Dilnoza came from a solid middle-class background, was well educated, 
spoke five languages, and unlike the vast majority of Uzbek women, she had a driver’s 
license.20 After dropping out of the police academy she was attending in 2002, Dilnoza 
began praying regularly, and in January 2004, she and her sister left home without a word 
to their parents, taking their Islamic literature in the house with them.21 Her recruitment 
by the Islamic Jihad Group, a radical offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU), likely resulted in her decision to carry out the operation. Dilnoza’s actions are 
reflective of a larger problem in Uzebekistan. According to an independent sociologist, 
                                                 
15 Two female suicide bombers killed themselves and three US Army Rangers at a checkpoint in western 
Iraq.  One of the women appeared to be pregnant, and as she exited the vehicle, she screamed for 
assistance, according to a US military officer. This attack by Iraqi women was the second attack in less 
than a week. Liz Sly and Hugh Dellios, Tribue foreign correspondents,“Women kill 3 Rangers in suicide 
bombing,” 5 April 2003. www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationsworld/  
16 “Woman suicide bomber strikes Iraq,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4289168.stm  
17 Email correspondence with a counterterrorism expert, September 2005. 
18 “Attacks injure nine in Egypt,” Columbia Daily Tribune, published 1 May 2005. 
http://www.showmenews.com/2005/May/20050501News020.asp  
19 IWPR Staff in Central Asia, “Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers,” RCA No. 278, 20 April 2004. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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 the ideological vacuum that resulted in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union—in which people became “impoverished and demoralized”—partly explains why 
Uzbek women were susceptible to being influenced by extremist organizations.22
 The attacks by women in Iraq, Egypt, and Uzbekistan—three women unrelated in 
culture, religion, and national identities—is reflective of a crisis in Muslim societies. In 
both instances, women who had never before conducted terrorist operations, are 
beginning to challenge their perceived enemies and male-only terror groups.  Their 
actions could provide an impetus for other Muslim women to either enlist in extremist 
organizations or volunteer for future attacks. 
 
Historical Precedence for Female Fighters 
For centuries, Muslim women in different struggles and communities have joined 
men on the front lines of war, and have died alongside them.  The most prominent 
example of an early Muslim woman in jihad is Nusayba bint K’ab, who fought in the 
Battle of Uhud with her husband and two sons and during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, she 
joined the Muslim troops, suffered eleven wounds, and lost one arm.23  The Prophet’s 
own female relatives took part in jihad; his wife, Ayesha, led the Battle of the Camel, and 
his granddaughter Zaynab bint Ali fought in the Battle of Karbala. Other women were 
recognized for tending to the wounded, donating their jewelry for the jihad, and 
encouraging their male family members to fight to ensure the survival of Islam.24
The involvement of the early Arab women in jihad is celebrated today throughout 
the Muslim world, serving as icons and a precedent25 for contemporary Muslim women 
who choose suicide operations. In modern-day resistance movements, a Christian 
Lebanese woman, Loula Abboud, “may have been the model for the first Palestinian 
women who became suicide bombers in 2002.”26 Before Palestinian women made 
headlines for conducting a series of terrorist attacks beginning in 2002, the dark-eyed 
petite girl of nineteen conducted a suicide operation in the Bekaa valley in southern 
Lebanon in April 1985, “exceeding all expectations” for men and women in war.27 
Described by her brother as a woman “fighting for the liberation of her own homeland,” 
Aboud’s struggle for “self-defense” and to “save the children” is echoed by other women 
around the world, including women of the first Palestinian intifada, who led a campaign 
to reopen schools, taught underground classes for children, and played an important role 
in “street activism that directly confronted the occupations forces.”28  
However heroic the modern-day female fighter may be regarded by her 
community, contemporary women warriors do not compare to her predecessors, whose 
sacrifice for Islam is venerated within Islamic textbooks, stories, and historical memory.  
The involvement of early women in jihad is recognized in the Qur’an and hadith, or 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Busool, Assad Nimer, Muslim Women Warriors, Chicago, Illinois: Al Huda, 1995.  p.35-37  
24 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
 
26 Davis, Joyce. Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East, New York: Palgrave 
MacMillian. 2003. p. 68. 
27 Davis, pp.68-72. 
28 Jennifer Plyler interview with Hanadi Loubani, founding member of Women for Palestine.  “Palestinian 
Women’s Political Participation,” WHRnet, 23 November 2003.  www.whrnet.org/docs/interview-loubani-
0311.html  
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 Muslim traditions.  Women also were rewarded for performing the same duties as men. A 
Qur’anic verse was revealed to reflect the equal status of both men and women: “Lo! 
Muslim men and Muslim women, and believer men and believer women, and men who 
obey and women who obey…Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a vast 
reward.” 
 
Eager to Level the Playing Field 
By taking part in operations, women are contesting the traditional roles assigned to 
them by patriarchal societies and terrorist groups. While women enlisted and played a 
pivotal role in operations, including the veteran Palestinian female Leila Khalid for a 
myriad of successful hijackings in the late 1960s and early 1970s, “the trouble is [that 
Muslim women] are not on the winning side, at least not yet.”29   
Her actions ensure, in part, that the discourse of women’s rights and position in 
society remains in the open forum.  Attacks she conducts could stir a needed debate in the 
Muslim world regarding the role of women within the patriarchal “space,” that could 
force existing binding norms into temporary disarray. Reasons why male fighters have 
welcomed, though previously denied, Muslim women access to operations is explained 
by organizational and societal needs.  Her vital contribution is assessed by the operational 
advantages and maximized media shock value that has helped to sustain, at least in the 
interim, by her involvement. 
But despite their involvement in war, women did not enjoy equal status with men 
until a woman from the Quraysh aristocracy, Umm Salama, one day asked the Prophet, 
“Why are men mentioned in the Quran and why are we not?”30  Her reply came in the 
form of a verse, “Lo! Men who surrender unto Allah, and women who surrender to Allah, 
and men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey, and women who 
obey…Allah hath prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward.”31  This verse, alone, 
revolutionized the Muslim community, illuminating a “break with pre-Islamic practices, 
the calling into question of the customs that ruled relations between the sexes.”32
Muslim women today often cite the early examples of the mujahidaat, but misplace 
their own struggles within a historical narrative that fails to explain contextual pressures, 
a term coined by Dr. Karla Cunningham, which refers to the impact of 
domestic/international enforcement, conflict, and social dislocation.  She argues that 
contextual pressures “impact societal controls over women [and could] 
facilitate…participation up to, and including, political violence.”33 The cycles of protest 
these women participate in, often leading to their recruitment into violent organizations, 
helps to frame their conflicts within a specific contextual background that they are often 
responding to.  For many Chechen women, including Hawa Barayev, the first Chechen 
female suicide bomber who targeted her husband’s assassin, revenge for the loss of male 
family members is a prime motivator.   
                                                 
29 Eileen MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, p.8 
30 Tabari, Tafsir, Dar al-Fikr edn, vol. 22, p. 10. 
31 Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, sura 33, verse 35. 
32 Mernissi, p. 119. 
33 Cunningham, Karla, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
26:171-195, 2003. (p. 172) 
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 In earlier conflicts, women rarely were granted an elevated status, regardless of her 
participation and at times, leading role in operations.  For example, the Algerian women 
who fought alongside the men in the Battle of Algiers against French colonial rule were 
instrumental on the war front, but assumed their traditional roles within Algerian society 
after independence of the Algerian state. Algerian women fought against the French 
colonial rule in 1958-1964 but returned to their homes after independence.34 Learning 
from the past, women in the Palestinian intifada were determined not to meet the fate of 
their Algerian sisters.  For example, Palestinian women formed a Women’s Higher 
United Council in and in June 1989, “had drafted an Equal Rights for Women bill and 
placed it before the Unified Leadership….’we wanted the men to know that we have 
teeth too, said one of the women from the Higher United Council.”35   
Despite the previous prejudices and obstacles against women, they have an 
opportunity in present-day conflicts to change the perception that al-Qa’ida and local 
terrorist groups are a “men” only confederation. Her participation could prove other 
women that she has a right to the rewards of martyrdom and her action can change the 
way local governments respond to the war on terror. Many women are determined to 
raise the gender equality issue.  According to Umm Usamah, the success of attacks by 
Palestinian women elevated the status of the Arab woman and ended the debate about 
equality between men and women, particularly after Wafa Idris’ suicide bombing.  
Exonerated for being the first Palestinian women to commit suicide, Idris’ likely inspired 
four other Palestinian women to commit suicide operations within four months.  Adel 
Hammudu, editor of the Egyptian opposition weekly, Saut al-Umma, referred to Idris as 
“the bride of heaven, [who] elevated the value of the Arab woman and in one moment, 
[and] put an end to the unending debate about equality between men and women.” 
 The unintentional debate that women in conflict arouses is plastic; no conflict 
today has elevated the status of the Muslim woman, nor attempted to address the societal 
and religious norms that solidify the role of the Muslim woman.  While her participation 
in suicide attacks serves the overall group or social movement, her individual 
contribution is seldom recognized, except in martyrdom fests within the Palestinian 
territories where female bombers are deemed necessary for operational and strategic 
adaptation against a well-armed adversary.   
 
Diverse Motivations for Female Fighters 
Local conflicts are critical motivators. Each conflict is unique and women choose 
suicide terror for a host of different reasons. For instance, aside from being linked by 
gender, the mujahidaat in Chechnya have little in common with women in Palestine, and 
women in Saudi Arabia have absolutely nothing to share with their “sisters” in 
Uzbekistan. 
 While conflicts and motivations vary, a woman’s decision to pursue violent action 
is impacted by personal experiences and outcomes. The absence of change to local 
conflicts around the world has motivated some women to opt for martyrdom operations 
to end their suffering.  For some women, the decision for martyrdom is rooted within the 
local struggle for freedom from the social and worldly responsibilities women have to 
bear within a weak civil society but more importantly, freedom from the tyranny women 
                                                 
34 MacDonald, Eileen, Shoot The Women First, London: UK: Fourth Estate Limited, 1991. Pp. 74-75. 
35 Ibid. p. 75. 
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 experience as a result of living under occupation, under the reign of despot rulers, and 
under the jihadist rhetoric and propaganda that convinces women that her local 
community can not afford inaction.  Suicide aso becomes the preferred tactic when 
Muslim women believe that their social structure, which is the fabric of an Islamic 
society, is threatened or has been violated by the prevailing authority.  
Contemporary resistance movements and conflicts have publicly endorsed suicide 
and male fighters encourage Muslim women to select the tactic for one of the following 
reasons: to preserve her honor and dignity; to seek revenge for the loss of male family 
members; to win respect from the larger Muslim community; to gain reassurance for 
herself and her community that she is a capable and equal partner in jihad; and perhaps 
most importantly to the violent organization, to ensure its survival. Therefore, her 
involvement in a predominantly male conflict helps to guarantee the existence of the 
national and/or social movement. In a March 2003 interview with the London-based Arab 
newspaper, Al Sharq al-Awsat, the leader of the women’s organization, Umm Usama, 
said Muslim women join the jihad to seek revenge for the capture of “our brothers Ramzi 
Bin al Shibah and Khalid al-Shaykh”36—both of whom were detained by Pakistani 
authorities in 2002 and 2003, respectively. 
The perceived threat against Islam is another powerful motivator to sanction the 
use of violence as an effective means of communication. For all Muslim women, faith 
likely plays a role, if only a minor one. Men are able to manipulate some Muslim women 
by shrouding the local or transnational struggle or for which they are fighting in religious 
undertones. In clever propaganda, they claim that Islam is under attack by Western 
imperialism, and argue that every able Muslim man and woman has a duty to defend the 
faith. Often, they cite the early Muslim women who fought and supported the early 
battles during the times of the Prophet to convince women that they are equal partners in 
jihad.  Using historical precedence to argue their point, men could gain new female 
recruits to take part in future operations.  Equally appealing to some women are female 
fighters who have either staged spectacular attacks or those who have survived in a male-
dominated terrorist organization, such as Leila Khaled,37 who said, Islam has “only a role 
in determining the choice in how the [Palestinian] struggle is to be waged.”38    
Assured of the rewards of martyrdom, women perceive they have nothing to lose.  
Printed in a HAMAS monthly publication al-Muslimah, Palestinian operative Reem 
Rayishi said, “I am proud to be the first female HAMAS martyr. I have two children and 
love them very much. But my love to see God was stronger than my love for my children, 
and I’m sure that God will take care of them if I become a martyr.”39  Even Dilnoza 
believed she would be granted spiritual rewards for her operation; in a letter to her 
mother, she wrote: “martyrs without a doubt will go to Paradise.” For the believer of 
martyrdom, subjugation to the faith (i.e., Islam) is rewarding. The individual, knowing 
                                                 
36 Ibid 
37 Leila Khaled, a member of the Marxist group, The Palestine Front For the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), became widely known after her role in a series of airline hijackings in 1969-1970.  She is most 
famously known for leading a daring hijacking of four airlines on 6 September 1970, which resulted in the 
destruction of three aircraft and her own capture. 
38 Westerman, Toby. “Cheerleader for female suicide bombers,” WorldNetDaily.com. 31 January 2002.  
39 Al-Muslimah, February 2004. 
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 that death is likely, “inspires other Muslims to continue the struggle and the martyr’s 
death is kindling wood for jihad and Islam.”40  
 
Al Khansaa—A Call to Arms 
Among the many functions women serve, their increasing role in exploiting the 
media and technology affords them a greater chance of broadening their chances for 
recruitment, even within the most patriarchal Muslim societies, such as Saudi Arabia. 
The “CNN factor” enables the female fighter to “generate a huge amount of publicity for 
the cause…and enabled global awareness.”41 Without television, print media, and now 
the colossal impact of the Internet, female suicide bombers would gain no less attention 
than male bombers.  Sageman argues that the Internet has changed the amount of access 
women now have to join operations in jihadist chat rooms, which had not existed before. 
He maintains that there had been a precedent for female fighters, but “now you have the 
mechanism [the Internet],”42 a gender-neutral forum that allows Muslim women to 
interact with men with a relatively low-cost output and high-value input.  
The use of the Internet offers Muslim women in restrictive societies—that adhere 
to the strict space separation between men and women—to initiate contact with Muslim 
men, develop relationships, and eventually become full members of radical organizations.   
Umm Usamah confirmed the extensive use of the Internet: 
 
with those who do no have access to the Internet,  
we have formed small groups or cells that  
are guided and backed personally and  
supervised like those using the Internet.   
Each of the women who have joined through 
the Internet is trained where she is because  
we cannot bring all the mujahidaat sisters in one  
place as each one is in a different country in the  
land of Islam.”43
 
Among the various influential magazines is Sawt al-Jihad, the propaganda arm of 
the Saudi-based al-Qa’ida network, which could have a significant impact on drawing 
women to the fight.  The magazine’s first issue of Al-Khansaa—the new online women’s 
magazine and also the name of a pre-Islamic poetess who lost four sons to jihad44—made 
its debut in August 2004 at www.kidwi.com/khansa. The publication implores Muslim 
women worldwide to join the war on terror against the perceived enemies of Islam. For 
example, in an article titled “What Role can Sisters Play in Jihad,” the anonymous author 
says, “there are many ways a Muslim woman can participate in Jihad…the sisters’ role 
on the battlefield [include]: 1. participation in the actual fighting; 2. supporting the 
                                                 
40 Lustwick, Ian S., “Terrrism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences,” in Martha Crenshaw, 
ed., Terrorism in Context.  University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 1995. p. 536. 
41 Bloom, Mia, Dying To Kill, Columbia University Press: New York, 2005. p. 39 
42 Interview with Dr. Marc Sageman, October 2005. 
43 “Al-Qa’ida’s Women Organization ‘Commander’ on Women’s Role in Jihad,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, 12 
March 2003. p. 3. GMP200303120000069.  
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 fighters in the battlefield; 3. Guard duty and protection.”45 Al-Khansaa also glorifies 
martyrs, including Abu Hajir, the former al-Qa’ida leader in Saudi Arabia,46 and 
celebrates the lives of the early Muslims who have died in battle.  
 
Scholars Support Female Martyrs 
To isolate this study from the ideological underpinnings of suicide terror, as 
delineated by some members of the Muslim clergy, would be to misplace the importance 
of scripture in determining when, and how, violence can be used.  The debate now being 
waged in various Islamic circles about the utility of suicide, and conversely, the use of 
women in warfare, has divided the Muslim ummah (community).  
The Muslim clergy have failed to reach consensus on  whether suicide is an 
acceptable means of warfare, but several scholars in the wake of the September 2001 and  
July 2005 attacks in London have issued various fatwas (provocations) condemning 
suicide bombings. The former head of Al-Azhar Fatwa Committee Shaykh ‘Atiyyah Saqr 
uses references to historical Islamic literature to argue that the Prophet Muhammad said a 
believer would be forbidden from entering Paradise if he committed suicide.47  More 
recently, a prominent Syrian cleric, Abdel Mon’em Mustafa Abu Halima, issued a fatwa 
prohibiting suicide operations.  A resident of London, Abu Halima, also known as Abu 
Naseer Al Tartusi, said “whoever hurts a Miuslim has no Jihad reward”, and quotes the 
Prophet as having said: “whoever murders a non-Muslim enjoying protection under the 
Islamic state would never smell the scent of Paradise.”48
However, the practice is justified by other clerics, including Doha-based Shaykh 
Yusuf Qaradawi and a veteran Afghan mujahid, Abdallah Azzam.  Both have justified 
the use of suicide and permit women to participate in jihad. Qaradawi refutes the term 
“suicide” as being “incorrect and misleading” and prefers the usage of “heroic operations 
of martyrdom.”  In an interview in an Egyptian newspaper, Qaradawi justifies suicide on 
the basis that it is “the weapon of the weak,49 and provides the following ruling on 
warfare:  
 
when jihad becomes an individual duty, as  
when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory,  
a woman becomes entitled to take part in it  
alongside men.. and she can do what is  
impossible for men to do,” even if it means  
taking off her hijab to carry out an operation.50    
 
Qaradawi first issued a fatwa on the role of women in jihad following the suicide 
attack by Wafa Idris, the first Palestinian Muslim woman to perpetrate an attack on 27 
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 January 2002 when she detonated explosives at the entrance to a shopping mall in Afula, 
a city in the northern part of Israel.  First published on the HAMAS Internet site, 
www.palestine-info.info in January 2004, Qaradawi said that Muslim women could 
disregard certain codes of dress and Islamic law to participate in suicide operations: 
“when jihad becomes an individual duty, as when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory, 
a woman becomes entitled to take part in it alongside men…and she can do what is 
impossible for men to do,” even if it means taking off  
her hijab (headscarf) to carry out an operation.51 Before Qaradawi’s fatwas, Abdullah 
Azzam in his book, Defense of Muslim Lands, empowered women when he said they did 
not need their husband’s permission to participate in jihad. In a separate fatwa published 
in 1984, Azzam said, “jihad was the action required (fardh ‘ayn) of every Muslim, 
regardless of gender.”52  
Today, the debate among the ulama on the permissibility of suicide continues to 
divide the Muslim world; some view suicide as a legitimate tactic while others defy it on 
the basis that it was never employed by the Prophet of Islam, and therefore, suicide is 
haram (forbidden). Many scholars argue that suicide is one of the major sins in Islam that 
annuls one’s faith,53 and those well versed in religious text often cite the Qur’anic verse, 
Al Maeda, that clearly rebukes those who kill: He who kills anyone not in retaliation for 
murder or to spread mischief in the land, it would be as if he killed all of mankind, and if 
anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.54
 
A Short-Lived Panorama 
The liberal door that now permits women to participate in operations will close 
once male jihadists gain new recruits and score a few successes in the war on terror. The 
sudden increase in female bombers over the past year may represent nothing more than a 
riding wave of Al Qaeda’s success rather than a lasting effort in the global jihad.  Male 
jihadists could find it difficult to accept a female operative as the revolutionary vanguard 
of Islam, and while younger members of Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are 
encouraging Muslim women to join the ranks, there is little indication that these men 
would allow the mujahidaat to prevail in their authority and replace images of the male 
folk-hero.  There is also no evidence that Muslim female operatives will have contact 
with senior male leaders, calling into question the male jihadists’ willingness to directly 
deal with women on an equal footing. 
The more conservative terrorist regards a Muslim woman as key to maintaining the 
family structure, while the new, younger generation of terrorists could increasingly 
encourage women to join their ranks to offset the losses of male operatives. She provides 
the male jihadist with multiple operational advantages, but while she is indispensable to 
the war effort, she also is expendable.   
While a female fighter might not enjoy the same status and rank as her male 
counterpart, her participation in suicide bombings could, in the near-term, provide 
impetus for other women to participate in future operations. A Muslim female academic 
states that “by resorting to this tactic [suicide], women would most likely appeal to the 
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 female Muslims in the world; that is, to those who are not aware, or have been prevented 
from becoming aware of the actual teachings of the Qur’an.”55  Suicide arguably attracts 
to those women who have an alienated view of Islam; that is, they have subscribed to the 
patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an, rather than understand the religious verses in 
their historical context. Coupled with the dire sociopolitical conditions under which some 
Muslims live, these women probably believe they have nothing to lose in this life, but 
have everything to gain from that-world (the Hereafter). 
Should suicide attacks become a trend among Muslim women, it would be the 
exception rather than the rule. Some terrorism experts understand that the jihad 
movement is not homogenous, and there are places where social mores are perhaps 
conducive to more ‘progressive’ treatment of women’s status. Even in Muslim societies 
where female fighters are the norm, (i.e., Palestinian territories) it still remains unclear 
whether traditional societal norms will make adjustments to afford women equal rights 
once the conflict ends. 
 
Policy Recommendations: Making Muslims Part of the Solution 
Compared to men, Muslim women have participated in a relatively small number 
of suicide attacks, but increased security measures against male jihadists and the ongoing 
struggles of national identity, couched in religious overtones and a socialization toward 
violence, forces Western and Muslim governments to reexamine their counter-terrorism 
policies. Sageman argues that the solution lies with “countering the entire terrorist 
movement rather than just the women,” and suggests looking at previous terrorism 
studies for insights. While women are a part of the overall movement, they represent an 
important element, and therefore, this uniqueness demands specific strategies to counter 
female participation. 
 Countering the increased use of Muslim women for suicide operations requires a 
multi-pronged approach looking closely at developing a set of common denominators, 
such as the factors that enhance a strong civil society, balanced economics, full political 
participation, and opportunities to question existing, and sometimes archaic, social and 
cultural norms that restrict women’s liberation and democratic movements. To achieve 
this, Western and Muslim governments need to make a concerted, long-term effort 
towards improving the social, economic, and political structures in their countries. 
Without addressing the local concerns, men will continue to recruit women, and rely on 
female volunteers, to gain visibility through terrorist operations.  Negative visibility can 
be reversed with positive reflections of women helping to steer Muslim women into 
active members of society. But who has the power to enforce progress and carry this 
enormous responsibility? A Muslim female academic says she doesn’t believe “in the 
ability of the West to counter this trend, [but] ‘believing women,’ who are intellectually 
capable and active in the pubic sphere, will unread the patriarchal interpretations of the 
Qur’an and thus will represent the teachings.”56  Many experts agree that Muslim 
Governments may have more power to counter religious extremists due to their deep 
cultural knowledge and understanding of local problems. Any effective counterterrorism 
policy will need to include the Muslim youth to ensure that their concerns are 
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 represented.  Absent their involvement, the next generation of terrorists could sustain 
collective action against the prevailing authority, threatening a government’s ability to 
suppress and manage emerging extremist networks.   
While many experts agree that the burden lies with the Muslim world to counter 
terrorism, the West can help by channeling much needed resources, financial aid, and 
development to alleviate some of the local grievances. Eroding the power of violent 
movements and support for militant groups can largely be achieved by encouraging an 
open political system that includes active female participation, rebuilding civil society, 
legislating education reform, accounting for human rights abuses and abetting Muslim 
women’s organizations, including religious-based groups managed by women. However, 
for any of these processes to take shape, the conflicts in the Muslim world must first end. 
Absent any resolution to the conflicts that resonate on the Muslim “street”, violence will 
remain the preferred course of action. 
Strategically, specific policy recommendations for the West should include: 
1) Promote democracy and democratic institutions. Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic 
Studies at American University, Akbar Ahmed, says that “there is no alternative [but to] 
institute and ensure the success of democracy” to close the gap between the rich and 
poor, to “emphasize the compassionate nature of Islam,” and “to rediscover the tolerance 
that once characterized their societies.”57  
2) Establish a more robust diplomatic relationship with the countries that support 
terrorist organizations; putting pressure on these countries with the support of the 
international community, rather than unilateral action, could force the countries that 
sponsor terrorism and countries in conflict to seize hostilities.  Playing the role of an 
honest broker, the US can help mediate conflicts and facilitate dialogue; 
3) Provide financial and organizational support to local groups, such as Muslim 
NGOs, think tanks, social activists, and legitimate religious establishments to help them 
counter extremist and terrorist elements within their societies. Western aid and resources 
should only be donated when local institutions guarantee their goal is to improve the lives 
of women in their respective communities, to include vocational training, access to higher 
education, and membership to religious-based parties and groups that have often closed 
the door to women.  
The Muslim world has an equal, if not greater, burden to bear. Since most female 
bombers come from Muslim-dominated societies, the governments under which these 
women live have a responsibility to its people—not just women alone—to eradicate 
violent organizations.  Recommended policies for the Muslim world should include, but 
is not limited to, the following:  
1) Reclaiming the right to Ijtehad (interpretation), a tool that can serve as “an 
effective weapon to cure the cancer of illiteracy, inaction, immobility, and diffidence.”58 
What is needed is a look towards the present and future, rather than the archaic traditions 
of the past that have handicapped Muslim societies from further achievement. As noted in 
the Qur’an, Verily Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they first change 
their conditions by themselves.59  By reexamining the practice of Islam within Muslim 
societies—much of which is influenced by culture and a skewed understanding of holy 
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 text—a female Muslim academic argues, Muslims need to “unread the patriarchal 
interpretations of Qur’anic teachings…[and Muslim countries] must allow, even 
encourage translations of the Qur’an into any language…to diffuse the power of 
patriarchal structures…to avoid anyone from claiming sole knowledge” of the religion.60 
Echoed by Akbar Ahmed, rebuilding “an idea of Islam, which includes justice, integrity, 
tolerance, and the quest for knowledge”61 is imperative to restoring the classical Islamic 
civilization, as well as rooting out “deviants’ such as religious extremists, terrorists, and 
anyone who manipulates faith for personal gain. Reopening the gates of ijtehad is 
essential to encouraging the liberal Islamist rationale.62 
2) Reserving for women political seats and membership to religious 
organizations; including women in key government decisions, if not positions, can help 
improve the country’s public image. Allowing women to participate in all levels of 
governance is an important way of routing frustration and anger into positive action; 
3) Rebuilding civil society, particularly in conflict-prone areas. Nothing could be 
more important to Muslims today than their basic needs, such as water, food, shelter, and 
a nominal sense of security. Muslim governments can upset terrorist recruitment in 
demographic areas that lack these basic needs by ensuring that people are self-sufficient. 
While terrorism is not always tied to economics, one’s level of frustration with their 
living conditions—or the poor living standards of Muslims in a distant land—is arguably 
one of the many motivations terrorists use to join violent organizations. As long as 
grievances exist, terrorists will have a canon-fodder readily available to gain new recruits 
and appeal to uneducated Muslims. 
On a tactical level, improving Western intelligence agencies, using both human and 
technical information gathering,63 is at the heart of operational success. First, sensitizing 
law enforcement to Muslim communities is essential to gaining their trust and 
cooperation. Training should involve: 1) knowing the enemy; and 2) understanding the 
various cultural and religious traditions in Muslim communities.  By educating the police, 
law enforcement, and intelligence organizations, targeting efforts and collection activities 
can be more precise, and less of a shot in the dark. Knowing who the enemies of the 
West—also the demons of the Muslim world—are will help foreign liaison services 
predict the terrorists’ next move and could encourage support from the local community. 
But forcing cooperation between Muslim community leaders and the host government is 
ineffectual unless authorities offer incentives to these communities, such as immunity 
from arrest, improved access to employment and other public goods that fall under the 
state jurisdiction. Establishing these relationships is not without growing pains. For 
example, the Dutch service indicated that relations with its local Muslim communities is 
dependent on cooperation from the imam (cleric) of a mosque or someone who has 
religious authority, and that, in light of their [the Muslims’] perceived alienation, is a 
difficult hurdle to overcome.64  
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 Secondly, learning from policies adopted by countries struggling with suicide 
bombers could help other governments learn what works, and what clearly does not. For 
example, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman argues that “we must change our approach to 
defending against suicide attacks” because profiling ne marche pas.65 Profiling is less 
effective today because the face of terror has changed. Once only a man’s “sport,” 
women are now terrorists, as are younger members of society. Hoffman maintains that in 
the absence of knowing who the perpetrator is, “the best defense relies on mobilizing the 
entire security force against the threat.” This requires increasing training for police and 
adding special units to law enforcement whose job it is to combat suicide bombers.66  
Also key to uprooting terrorism is to know what has failed. For example, abduction of 
Chechen women by Russian security forces to avenge attacks against Russian civilians by 
Chechen female terrorists may fuel resentment and motivate, rather than deter, women 
from joining terrorist groups.67
 In addition, improving liaison services’ email collection of female, and male, users 
seeking participation in attacks can provide opportunities to disrupt the terrorist networks 
online. As more violent organizations escape the public eye and operate underground, the 
Internet will be the key to their survival; that is, the Internet can replenish the 
organization’s losses with new recruits, a stable source of income, an exchange of 
operational tactics, and ultimately, evade capture by the security service. Women have 
the most to gain from this open venue, particularly women residing in a dominant culture 
that prohibits interaction with men, and disallows women equal opportunities.  Tapping 
into this “market” will require that authorities’ have technical abilities and linguistic 
skills to veil their identities when entering the chat room.  
Finally, intelligence would not be intelligence without recruitment. Perhaps the 
only way to acquire operational nuggets about the plans and intentions of terrorist 
organizations is to enter the network. How this can be accomplished without exposing the 
Western hand will require additional research and focus. If access to male terrorists is a 
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